Questions

Read this before anything else on the page.

The pattern you enter describes when you do not have your children. For most people that is a scheduling detail. If you are separating from someone who has been controlling, monitoring or violent, it is close to the most useful thing they could know about you, because it is when you are alone.

We do not verify anyone’s identity. We do not run criminal background checks. We cannot tell you whether the person who opened your link is the person you sent it to. Anyone holding the link can open it, and open it again, until the pairing is deleted or expires.

Your schedule is encrypted against someone who steals our database. It is not hidden from the person you send the link to. Someone who enters a very wide pattern sees your availability reflected back at them. Our caps and locks limit how much shows in one pass. They do not make the reveal safe.

So the answer is not a setting. If someone learning when you are alone, when you are without your children, or when you are away from home could put you at risk, do not use OffWeekend with that person. There is no smaller schedule and no careful way of using it that removes this. Do not send them a link.

One more thing, because people miss it. If anyone else can read your email, do not give us your address. We never put a schedule in an email or in a subject line, but a message saying your link has an answer still tells whoever sees it that you are arranging something. The same is true of your browser history, and of any calendar you share with someone else.

If you are in danger in the United States, the National Domestic Violence Hotline is 1-800-799-7233, and thehotline.org has a chat option. We are a scheduling tool. We do not monitor anything here and we cannot help beyond this page.

No. There are no profiles, no photos, no browsing, no search, no swiping, no matching, and no way to send a message through OffWeekend. Nobody is here to be found. You bring someone you already know, from wherever you already met, and the tool does one thing: it finds hours you are both free.

We do not verify identity, and we do not conduct criminal background screenings of anyone who uses OffWeekend. Nothing here is a safety check on the person you are meeting.

Yes, and people do. The tool compares two repeating schedules; it has no idea why you want the answer. Two friends with shift work, a parent and a grandparent arranging visits, two people in a band trying to rehearse. Nothing about the product assumes a date except some of the wording.

No, and there is not one to make. No password, no sign-in, no profile, nothing to log out of. The link itself is what opens a pairing.

That is a real trade. It means there is no password to steal and nobody to impersonate, and it also means that if you lose the link and never gave us an email address, we cannot get you back in. See I closed the tab.

Nothing. There is no payment page, no card field, no trial and no paid tier. It is also a free experiment run by one person, which means it may break, be wrong, or be switched off. Do not build anything you depend on around it.

One person, in California, building it as an Agor AI product. There is no team, no office, no investors and no support desk. Mail reaches a human, not a queue, and not on a schedule. That is worth knowing before you decide how much to trust it.

No. What this produces is an estimate from a pattern you typed in yourself. It is not a record of anything, it proves nothing about what happened, and it is not legal, financial or custody advice. We are not the ones to advise you about your own arrangement, and nothing here is written with that in mind.

Your first name, and the times you have in common. Not your pattern, not which nights you have your children, not why any particular evening does not work, not your email address, not your time zone, and not how long you took. If you gave an email address it is never shown to them and never sent to them. Whatever you type in the name field is shown to them, so put a first name in it and nothing else.

Nobody can look you up. There is no directory, no search, and nothing published. This only happens between two people holding the same link.

Here is the part we would rather not have to write. OffWeekend shows both of you the hours you are both free. If the other person enters a pattern claiming they are free at all hours, the overlap they see is simply your availability. That does not require anyone to lie: a person who genuinely has wide-open evenings learns the same thing.

We cap the result at the three soonest windows, and we lock a pattern once it is submitted, so the same pairing cannot be widened and used to probe you again. Those limits reduce how much someone learns in one pass. They do not stop someone who creates a second and a third pairing with different patterns and sends you those instead. Nothing in this version prevents that.

An earlier version of this product described the overlap step as anonymising your schedule. That was not true and we removed it. Encryption protects stored data. It does not protect an inference someone draws from an answer you chose to show them.

Yes, mechanically. We can only show overlap with hours you actually entered, so a narrower pattern exposes less, and nothing here checks your answer against your real week.

Read that as exactly what it is. It reduces how much is shown. It is not a safety measure and it is not an answer to the question at the top of this page. If the risk is that a particular person should not know when you are alone, the answer there is not to use the tool with them at all.

Per person, per link:

• Your custody pattern as a repeating shape, with handoff times.
• The hours you said you would be willing to go out.
• Any dates you blocked off.
• Your time zone.
• Your first name.
• The agreed time, if a date gets agreed.
• An email address, only if you chose to give one.

There is no surname field, no phone number, no photo, no address, no location, no gender and no age. Not “we choose not to ask” — there is nowhere to type any of it.

Pairing records are stored encrypted. The key is derived from the secret part of your link, the part after the #, which your browser does not send as part of the address it requests. Someone who obtained a copy of the database alone would get ciphertext and none of the keys that open it.

That is protection against a stolen database. It is not protection against the person you send the link to, and it is not end-to-end encryption. To show you an overlap, our server receives the secret from your link in a request header and derives the key for that request. Anyone holding the link can open the pairing, as often as they like, until it is deleted or expires.

We do not run ads. There are no trackers, advertising pixels, third-party analytics, social widgets, session recording or fingerprinting here, and we give your information to no one.

What we count is counters and nothing else: how many links were made, opened, answered, proposed, confirmed. Plain numbers that go up, with no identifiers and no per-event timestamps, so they cannot be turned back into a record of who did what or when.

The honest split: that is our analytics. Serving a website is a separate thing, and our hosting provider handles your IP address to deliver the page to you and to stop one person hammering the service, the same as any website. We do not store it alongside anything you entered, and we never see a list of who visited.

We do not respond to Do Not Track or Global Privacy Control signals, because there is no tracking here for them to switch off.

No cookies at all. Your browser keeps a short list of the links you made, in local storage on your own device, so that the links page can show them to you. That never leaves your device. Clearing your browser data clears it, and if you have no other copy of a link, it is then gone.

Only if you gave an address, and only these: your own link when you make one, a note when your link has an answer, a note when a time is suggested, a note when a time is confirmed, and your list of links if you ask for it.

No subject line contains a name, a date or a schedule, and neither does the first line of any message, so a notification on a locked phone shows nothing about who or when. Open the message and it does tell you: who answered, and what the time is. That is the point of sending it.

An email is a durable copy in a mailbox, and mailboxes get read by other people far more often than databases get breached. Our mail also passes through Gmail, which keeps its own copy of what we sent. If any of that is a risk for you, do not give us an address.

OffWeekend is for adults, eighteen and over. There is nowhere to enter a child’s name, age, school, address or photo, and we ask you not to type any of it into the name field. Whatever you put in that field is shown to the other party.

Be aware of what the pattern itself carries. You are entering your own availability, but that availability comes from your parenting arrangement, so it can reveal your family’s routine. If your arrangement is subject to a court order limiting what you can share, that is your call to make, and we are not the ones to advise you on it.

Most are not, which is why the custom builder is in the first version rather than a later one. You can lay out your own fortnight and set the actual handoff times, to the half hour.

The reason that matters: real arrangements hand over in the middle of a day, not at midnight. “Thursday after school through Monday evening” has three different transition times in it. A tool that only understood whole days would offer you a Thursday evening you do not actually have.

This is the weakest part of the product and we would rather flag it loudly than let you find out. What you enter is a school-year pattern. “Thursday after school” means nothing in July, and many arrangements have a separate holiday rotation and a separate summer schedule that override the regular cycle entirely.

We do not know your arrangement, so we cannot apply those. You can block out date ranges, and for anything near a school break you should. Check any suggested night against your actual arrangements before you commit to it.

It will show a night you do not have, or hide one you do. The tool only knows the repeating pattern you typed; it has no idea a particular week was traded. Block the dates you swapped away, and treat anything it suggests as a candidate to check rather than an answer to rely on.

That works. Each side enters times in their own local zone and the comparison is done in real time, not in clock time, so an 8pm in Denver and an 8pm in Boston are correctly treated as different moments. Daylight saving is handled too, including the weekend where one country has changed and the other has not.

Anyone who has it. That is the trade for having no accounts: the link is the key, so there is nothing to log into and also nothing standing between the link and whoever holds it. Treat it like a door code rather than like a username.

It matters in ordinary situations, not only dramatic ones: a forwarded message, a shared tablet, a notification on a lock screen, a phone somebody else knows the passcode to. Only the first person to answer becomes the other side of the pairing, so a link cannot be answered twice, but anyone holding it can open what has already been revealed, as often as they like.

Delete it. Open the link, use the delete control, and the pairing ends for both sides immediately. Then make a new one if you still want to. Deleting is the only thing that revokes a link, because holding the link is the only credential this system has.

Three ways back, in order of likelihood:

• The links page, which lists every pairing this browser has held, from local storage on your device.
• Your browser history, or wherever you pasted the link when you sent it.
• Your inbox, if you gave an email address. You can ask us to send your links again.

If none of those apply, it is unrecoverable and you will need to make a new one. We cannot look it up for you, because with no account there is nothing to look you up by.

No, and this is deliberate rather than unfinished. If either side could keep editing and re-reading the result, they could nudge their own answer over and over and read the other person’s free time back out of the changes. Locking it is what stops that within one pairing.

If you got it wrong, delete the pairing and make a new link. It takes twenty seconds and costs nothing.

Nothing happens, and nothing is revealed. The link sits there and deletes itself after fourteen days. They are never told you made it, never chased, and never emailed by us — we have no way to contact them and do not want one.

Wherever you put it. It downloads to your device and you add it to whichever calendar you choose, so think for a second about which calendar that is. A calendar you share with family, with an ex, or with an employer will show the entry to everyone who can see that calendar.

We do not email the file and we never see which calendar you used. If tapping it did nothing, you are most likely inside another app’s built-in browser, which often blocks downloads — open the link in your normal browser instead.

Everything you enter is scheduled to be deleted from the service within fourteen days of the link being made. Either party can delete a pairing immediately from their own link, and that ends it for both of you. Holding the link is what authorises that, because it is the only proof of ownership this system has.

It removes the record from the service, for both of you, and drops the entry from the list we use to email you your own links.

It does not recall a screenshot, a forwarded link, a browser history entry, a calendar file someone already downloaded, an email already sitting in a mailbox, or copies held by our hosting and email providers under their own retention. Nobody can un-send those and we will not pretend otherwise.

No, and that refusal is the feature. We cannot confirm that the person asking owns that address, and answering would tell anyone who guesses an address whether that person has used OffWeekend. That is precisely the answer this system is built not to give.

What you can do: ask for your links to be emailed, and they go to that address and only that address, whether or not anything was found. Or write to us from the address and ask to be removed from the list. We will do it, and we will not tell you whether it was there.

There is no account, so there is nothing to log into and nothing to export. Please do not email us your link: whoever reads that message can open the pairing.

We block the EU, the UK, the EEA and Switzerland at the edge. Not because of anything to do with your data, but because doing it properly there is more than a one-person experiment can honestly take on. Refusing to serve you is more respectful than pretending otherwise.

support@agor.love. It is read by a person, not a queue, so it may take a few days. Please do not include your link in the message: it is the key to your pairing, and email is not a good place to keep a key.